Thursday, December 14, 2006

Does He or Doesn’t He?

Sextus Empiricus, a physician and Skeptic philosopher (c. AD 200) created a rather lengthy argument against the arguments for the existence of god(s) that, despite his stated belief that god exists, is intended to neither prove nor disprove the existence of god(s), but is instead intended to point out the problems inherent in other philosophical school’s logical reasoning for the existence of god(s). While the argument against the dogmatists’ arguments is craftily worded to avoid contemporary criticism, much less make an affirmative statement one way or the other, Sextus creates a very strong argument for the non-existence of god(s), while conflicting with the Skeptic goal of freedom from disturbance and avoidance of dogmatism.


Do Skeptics believe or not believe in the existence of god? Reading Sextus, it is hard to say for certain. On face value, for the Skeptic’s, god exists. However, to say one way or another whether god(s) exist would be dogmatic, as any such statement would be assenting to “something non-evident investigated by the sciences,” another contradiction of the skeptic stance (Inwood, 305). Even discussing the existence or non-existence of god is a contradiction of the skeptic stance, as there are no generally agreed-upon “self-evident” appearances or perceptions of god for the skeptic to dispute and/or investigate. Any such argument, regardless of outcome, is a contradiction of the stoic’s goal of “freedom from disturbance with respect to matters of belief” (307). Yet Sextus clearly states a belief in the existence of god(s): 
“…we say undogmatically that gods exist and that we revere them and we say that they are providential[1]” (362)

In fact, Sextus opens his entire argument against the (dogmatic) school’s arguments (for/against existence of god) with this statement. It is unlikely that Sextus is making such a statement solely for politically-correct purposes, or for purposes of stating his actual true personal beliefs: it is abundantly obvious Sextus intended to attack only their argument, not their belief one way or the other, but the result is an argument that is a strong statement for the non-existence of god.

Using skepticisms’ logical framework, how something appears is almost always uncertain because everything appears differently to everyone. Investigating how something appears is a waste of time; only “whether it really is such as it appears” can be investigated and determined (306, emphasis added). Sextus asks “how shall we be able to acquire a conception of god when we do not agree about his substance nor about his form nor about his location?”, a question still asked today (362). Since neither the appearance or non-appearance of god can be agreed upon, nor can any investigation to date determine whether god really is as he appears (assuming any sort of agreement ever being reached about whether any appearance actually exists); therefore, a skeptic should, for the sake of ataraxia (αταραξια), choose to suspend any judgement.
Sextus thoroughly empasizes the importance of suspending judgement throughout all of his writings; his statement that gods exist should not be taken to be his true belief based on all his following arguments. . When there is “equal force” to both sides of an argument, one must suspend judgement, yet Sextus does not suspend judgement

As to the nature of god, whether or not god exists, Sextus’ argument against an incorporeal god is compelling and a logically strong argument for the non-existence of god (371). An incorporeal existence implies an existence outside of matter, one that cannot interact with the physical world as we know it. Since it is assumed (actually strongly believed by most people world-wide) that gods can and do interfere and intervene in human life, they cannot be non-incorporeal[2], because to do so would require the ability to interact with the physical world: they must have a body of some sort. Just because the common “conception of the gods…has always existed” doesn’t necessarily mean gods do exist, much less common conceptions of appearances (366). Regardless, being incorporeal implies to a certain extent weakness, but “it is counter to the [common] conception of god that he should be weaker than anything” (364). So if god is not incorporeal, god must have a body…but having a body implies mortality and a certain amount of weakness, which doesn’t fit the common “conception” of god any more than an incorporeal existence does (364). It is, at least to date, “self-evident” that gods do not have a body, because if they did have a body, the nature of their appearance (is it really as it appears) could be investigated. Since it is impossible for god to be incorporeal and interact as is widely believed, and since “god’s existence is neither self-evident on its own” (no body), one should suspend judgment (363). God’s nature, much less existence, is ungraspable, especially because of the “equal force” of both sides of the argument (303). In fact, Sextus does state that it is “necessary to suspend judgment concerning whether he exists or not” (362).

One of the other arguments that Sextus discusses for the existence of god is “that which generates rational and prudent beings is itself certainly rational and prudent” is unfounded logic The argument is simple: we exist, we are (supposedly) rational and prudent, therefore something rational and prudent created us. While structurally this is a valid argument, it still defies a certain amount of logic. The Greeks, including apparently Sextus, believe not only that god created man, but that god created everything. To state that something “rational and prudent” will create something else that is “rational and prudent” to some extent implies that “rational and prudent” beings can only create “rational and prudent” beings and that non-rational beings/objects can only create other non-rational beings/objects (367). Yet god (according to the Greeks) created trees, stones, grass, and other (generally agreed upon) non-rational objects. Rational beings can create irrational beings/objects: a child born in a vegetative state is undoubtedly non-rational. Of course, this assumes human rationality. For Sextus, “man cannot be the absolutely best animal, considering just the fact that he conducts his whole life in vice,” therefore there is no certainty on the appearance of man’s rationality so this also something that judgment should be suspended on. If one suspends judgment on the rationality/irrationality of mankind, then one must suspend judgment on the rationality/irrationality of god (366). The argument for the existence of god goes further by using the cosmos itself as an argument for god. The cosmos moves in an “orderly and harmonious way,” and if something moves (is moved) “in an orderly and harmonious way, it will be something divine and supernatural” (369). Since the cosmos moves in an orderly and harmonious way, such movement must be caused by something “divine and supernatural;” therefore, it must be god. As there are other things that move in an orderly and harmonious way (i.e., ants heading towards the picnic basket) and do so without the aid of either an incorporeal or noncorporeal god, the cosmos-based argument for god cannot work. One must still suspend judgment on the existence of god.

In fact, every argument for (or against) the existence of god that Sextus disputes ends with the same result: one must suspend judgment, at least. Sextus points out so many weaknesses[3] and flaws in the dogmatic arguments for the existence of god that the argument is not even one of “equal force” anymore: one must go further and determine that since the arguments for the existence of god are so weak¸ one must conclude (or at least consider) that god does not exist. God is not incorporeal nor corporeal, god is neither weak nor strong, god is neither rational nor irrational; in fact, regardless of which dualistic combination one applies to any hypothetical appearance or conception of god results in a null answer.


Works Cited

Inwood, Brad and L.P. Gerson. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Second Edition: 1997. Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge.


[1] This statement is very clever. The use of the word “undogmatically” is an obvious attempt to avoid criticism from Sextus’s fellow skeptics, while appeasing the political powers with “revere” and the religious powers with “providential.” Sextus, like others before him, is doing his best to avoid the fate of Socrates but also make another point as discussed above. It is amazing that, even today, in our separation of church and state culture, it is still not only politically correct but politically and socially wise to pay lip service to the dominant cultural believe in the existence (or non-existence) of god.
[2] Of course, modern physics would argue that an incorporeal entity – energy-based existence – is capable of moving objects, given a strong enough amount of energy…
[3] My personal favorite of Sextus’ arguments was the one about worship. People worship god, so therefore god must exist. Very funny (no offense intended)! People – well, kids – worship Santa Claus but we know without doubt that Santa Claus does not exist! Granted, to claim that people are foolish for worshiping something they know does not exist, or cannot assert with confidence would likely get one in a lot of social and/or political trouble.
Written for Professor Tanner's Hellenistic Philosophy class at UCCS, December 14, 2006

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